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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

TRADE REGULATIONS-DECEPTIVE PRACTICEs-Petitioner, an importer,
distributed catalogs among some 25,000 retailers describing his porcelain line as
follows: "IMPORTED Hand Decorated 'Du Barry' Porcelain," and " 'Du BARRT
Porcelain table lamps are nationally famous as reproductions of rare, original
French and English 'old pieces.'" The Federal Trade Commission found that
the advertising impliedly represented that the origin was French or British,
whereas the products were made in Japan. A cease and desist order was issued
prohibiting use of the legend, "Imported-Du Barry,'' or any other legend
suggesting French origin, without clearly disclosing the fact of import from
Japan. Held, affirmed. The order did not deprive petitioner of the use of its
trade-mark "Du Barry." Edward P. Paul & Co., Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, (App. D.C., 1948) 169 F. (2d) 294.
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This decision indicates that the courts may be prepared to support the F.T.C.
in establishing a high standard of advertising morality. Judicial restraints have long
hampered the commission, largely as a result of two highly restrictive decisions:
the Gratz case,1 which denied the commission power to prohibit a practice unless
that practice was unfair under the common law; and the later Raladam case,2
which set up rigorous jurisdictional requisites. Subsequent decisions have limited
the Gratz case,3 while the Wheeler-Lea Act 4 repudiated the Raladam holding.
The commission can now act where it finds an unfair or deceptive practice in
commerce, as long as its action appears to be in the public interest. Even the public
interest requirement is in the process of being discarded as a limiting device, 5 since
it seems to be satisfied by the mere finding of a deceptive practice. This conclusion
is supported by the Mayers case,6 in which the court said, "It is in the interest of
the public to prevent the sale of commodities by the use of false and misleading
statements and representations." Therefore, it appears that a deceptive practice
in commerce is the only real requisite to the commission's jurisdiction. Moreover,
the courts are demonstrating a marked tendency to accept the commission's findings
of unfair or deceptive practices, and this acceptance is the foundation upon which
the agency is enlarging its field of activity. The common law standards of unfair
practices are no longer controlling,7 and the commission's finding of a deceptive
practice is conclusive, if based upon substantial evidence.8 As the principal case
1

F.T.C. v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421, 40 S.Ct. 572 (1920).
F.T.C. v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 51 S.Ct. 587 (1931).
8
F.T.C. v. Winsted Hosiery Co., 258 U.S. 483, 42 S.Ct. 384 (1922); F.T.C.
v. R. F. Keppel & Bro., Inc., 291 U.S. 304, 54 S.Ct. 423 (1934); F.T.C. v. Standard
Education Soc., 302 U.S. II2, 58 S.Ct. II3 (1937); Handler, "Unfair Competition and
the Federal Trade Commission," 8 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 399 (1940).
4
52 Stat. L. III (1938), 15 U.S.C. (1946) § 45; Wolf v. F.T.C., (C.C.A. 7th,
1943) 135 F. (2d) 564; Parke, Austin & Lipscomb, Inc. v. F.T.C., (C.C.A. 2d, 1944)
142 F. (2d) 437.
5
F.T.C. v. Royal Milling Co., 288 U.S. 212, 53 S.Ct. 335 (1933); F.T.C. v.
Klesner, 280 U.S. 19, 50 S.Ct. 1 (1929); National Silver Co. v. F.T.C., (C.C.A. 2d,
1937) 88 F. (2d) 425.
6
L. & C. Mayers Co., Inc. v. F.T.C., (C.C.A. 2d, 1938) 97 F. (2d) 365 at 367.
1
F.T.C. v. Standard Education Soc., (C.C.A. 2d, 1936) 86 F. (2d) 692 at 696,
where the petitioner was found to have misrepresented the value and normal price of its
book service; the court said:"••• its [the commission's] duty in part at any rate, is to
discover and make explicit those unexpressed standards of fair dealing which the conscience
of the community may progressively develop."
8
A.P.W. Paper Co., Inc. v. F.T.C., (C.C.A. 2d, 1945) 149 F. (2d) 424; Charles
of the Ritz Distributors Corp. v. F.T.C., (C.C.A. 2d, 1944) 143 F. (2d) 676; Progress
Tailoring Co. v. F.T.C., (C.C.A. 7th, 1946) 153 F. (2d) 103, where petitioner
advertised "free suits" to salesmen accepting employment when in fact they were
required to pay with services; the court said at p. 105, "The Commission may require
advertisements to be so carefully worded as to protect the most ignorant and unsuspecting
purchaser •••"; Zenith Radio Corp. v. F.T.C., (C.C.A. 7th, 1944) 143 F. (2d) 29;
Howe v. F.T.C., (C.C.A. 9th, 1945) 148 F. (2d) 561; Vacu-matic Carburetor Co v.
F.T.C., (C.C.A. 7th, 1946) 157 F. (2d) 711; Gulf Oil Corp. v. F.T.C., (C.C.A. 5th,
1945) 150 F. (2d) 106.
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illustrates, evidence to support a reasonable inference of a mere capacity to deceive
the general public will suffice.
Earl R. Boonstra

